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German Politics and the European Community 
1. The Federal Republic and the European Community - a historical 
overview 
1.1. The establishment of the Federal Republic as a decision in favour 
of Western integration 
Developments in post-war Germany, as well as in post-war Europe, were 
dependent on the constellation of the international System which had been 
determined by the antagonism between the two super-powers which at the 
same time were (together with France and the United Kingdom) Occu-
pying Powers and held supreme authority in Germany. The Cold War as 
a conflict between two totally imcompatible types of political Systems had 
its effects on the policies the Big Four pursued in Germany - they could 
not reach consensus in basic questions concerning Germany's future -
and their dissent as Occupying Powers contributed to intensifying the 
Cold War. East and West (the French joined, after some hesitation, the 
course favoured by the Americans and the British since 1946/47) seemed 
to be determined to consolidate their respective areas by setting up a 
coherent Organization of states and to include their Occupational Zones 
into these adverse organizations, or better: blocs. 
The three Western allies, together with the Benelux countries, came in 
June 1948 to the conclusion, »that for the political and economic well-be-
ing of the countries of Western Europe and of a democratic Germany, 
there must be a close association of their economic life.« And »this close 
association, which will enable Germany to contribute to and participate 
in European recovery, has been ensured by the inclusion on April 16 of 
the combined (= American and British, R. H.) zone and French zone in 
the Organization for European economic Cooperation as füll members.« 
In this context they considered »the problem of the evolution of the 
political and economic Organization of Germany« and recognized »that it 
is necessary to give the German people the opportunity to achieve on the 
basis of a free and democratic form of government the eventual re-es-
tablishment of German unity at present disrupted«.1 
As a consequence, the Military Governors did »authorize the Minister-
Presidents (= Prime Ministers, R. H.) of the states of their respective 
zones to convene a constituent assembly . . .«; they declared: »The consti-
tuent assembly will draft a democratic Constitution which will establish 
for the participating states a governmental structure of federal type which 
is best adapted to the eventual reestablishment of German unity at 
present disrupted, and which will protect the rights of the participating 
states, provide adequate central authority, and contain guarantees of 
individual rights and freedoms«.2 The new German State should, accord-
ing to these Statements, have a Western type political System and become 
an integral part of the emerging Western Community. 
The (West) Germans not only accepted these guidelines, they regarded 
them as being in line with their own preferences. As far as the character of 
the political System was concerned the constitutions for Single West Ger-
man Länder3 provided the democratic quality of society and State Organi-
zation and served as model for the Basic Law, the Constitution of the West 
German State. And as far as its place in the international System was con-
cerned, the constituent assembly decided in favour of integrating the Fe-
deral Republic into Europe (what under the conditions of Cold War and a 
divided Europe meant Western Europe).4 Not only was the perspective of 
belonging to a Western European Community implied in the decision to 
establish the Federal Republic, all major political forces - with the excep-
tion of the Communists 5 - supported the respective constitutional provi-
sions. The basic decision to join a Western European Community and to 
contribute to its construction had been taken as early as 1948/49. 
1 Recommendation of six powers concerning the development of Germany's political and 
economic Organization, of June 2, 1948; text of Communique. 
2 Frankfurt Document No. 1, concerning a Constituent Assembly, of July 1, 1948, issued 
by the Military Governors of the U S , UK, and French Zones of Occupation in Ger-
many. 
3 They had been issued in November/December 1946 in the Länder of the US zone, in 
May 1947 in the Länder of the French zone; in the Länder of the British zone following 
the British tradition of no formal written Constitution, constitutions were proclaimed 
not before the Federal Republic came into existence in 1949. 
4 Cf. the preamble and Article 24 of the Basic Law. 
5 Only 2 out of 65 members of the Constituent Assembly (»Parlamentarischer Rat«). 
1.2. Steps towards integrating the Federal Republic into a Western 
European Community 
From the very beginning the Federal Republic participated actively in 
efforts to build up a West European Community. She did belong to the 
group of six countries (together with France, Italy and the Benelux coun-
tries) which were ready to enter a totally new type of international Organi-
zation, characterized by some sort of supranationalism, and transfer part 
of their sovereignty to the new Community and its institutions: 
- The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was the first of 
that kind of international organizations with a supranational agency. 
- The European Defence Community (EDC) together with the project 
of a European Political Community (EPC) were attempts to continue 
the approach of the ECSC. Both projects failed in 1954.6 
- The Rome Treaties established in 1957 the Common Market (= Euro-
pean Economic Community) and the European Atomic Energy Com-
munity which were later fused - together with the ECSC - into the Eu-
ropean Communities, or Community. 
The attacks of the SPD Opposition against the first project »were never 
directed against integration or Europeanization as such . . . The core of 
the SPD's criticism was that the ECSC treaty represented a regional 
alliance organized by reactionary elements who sought to perpetuate 
capitalism and lay the groundwork for the economic and political control 
of Western Europe. Socialist spokesmen argued that the Schuman Plan 
was in effect an attempt to continue occupation policies and that it was 
designed to decisively shape the development and ultimate characteristics 
of Germany's economic and social order«. And they »attacked French 
attempts to seek admission of the Saar as an autonomous entity, and 
depicted the Schuman Plan as an international conspiracy to impede 
German unification and to handicap German industry's ability to com-
pete with France on world markets«.7 So the SPD's argument was not 
against integration but against a wrong step: the envisaged ECSC would 
violate severely national interests. 
6 The refusal of a majority in the French parliament (Assemblee Nationale) to decide in 
favour of EDC as one version of West German rearmament and the inclusion of this 
German potential in an integrated Community stopped the ambitious attempt of accele-
rating and deepening integration. 
7 Wolfram F. Hanrieder, West German Foreign Policy 1949-1963, International Pres-
sure and Domestic Response, Stanford 1967, p. 120. 
West German membership in the EDC - and West German rearmament 
as such - was opposed by the SPD for the following reasons: »it would 
render unification more difficult, if not impossible, by attaching West 
Germany too closely to one of the Cold War camps; it would increase 
world tensions and antagonize the Soviet Union without substantially 
improving the Western defense posture; it was dangerous for the fledgling 
German democracy because it would bring to the fore militarist elements 
and other objectionable remnants of the old order; and finally, it paved 
the way to Germany's integration in a Western European group that 
threatened to split free Europe and showed conservative-clerical ten-
dencies«. 8 The SPD's principal concern was to avoid definite Steps to-
wards military integration before an attempt of overcoming the division 
of Germany (and Europe!) via East-West negotiations had been made. 
There was no hesitation concerning economic integration which the party 
considered as useful and necessary. 
The Rome Treaties, therefore, were supported by both big parties, and 
the SPD Opposition did welcome them expressively as an important step 
towards a comprehensive economic, and later political European Com-
munity on a constitutional basis. The party considered this project of 
economic integration - including its perspective towards developing a 
political community - as compatible with attempts to bring about Ger-
man reunification. This attitude adopted by the Social Democratic Oppo-
sition in 1957 marked the beginning of a bipartisan foreign policy, which 
was agreed upon »formally« with Statements of SPD spokesmen in the 
parliamentary debate on June 30th, 1960. 
1.3. Federal Republic and EC-development since the sixties 
John Pinder makes a distinction between two periods of EC development: 
»negative« and »positive« integration.' The term »negative integration« 
refers to a period, in which the EC was primarily concerned with re-
placing obstacles and barriers on the way towards establishing a common 
market with free flow of goods, capital, labour and Services: the so called 
transitional period which ended with the summit in The Hague in 
8 Wolfram F. Hanrieder, pp. 101/102. 
9 See his article »Positive Integration and Negative Integration: Some Problems of Eco-
nomic Union in the EEC«, in: The World Today 24 (1968), pp. 88-110. 
December 1969. The label »positive integration« refers to the following 
period with its endeavours of formulating and implementing common 
policies in different fields: proposals, plans and attempts aiming at the 
establishment of a common economic and monetary, welfare and regio-
nal policy can be regarded as characteristical for that period. The EC 
should and would be made the framework and »actor« in which and by 
whom major issues with highest saliency would be dealt with. The per-
spective - and ambition - has not been directed at replacing the nation 
states but at developing the EC towards a complementary political unit. 
The Federal Republic did engage in both periods and tried to contribute 
to integration progress. In the first period integration was going »calm« 
and steadily which means a process dominated by national governments 
and their administration, as expert knowledge was asked for. Not only 
the broad public but political actors - parties and pressure groups - as 
well were more or less mere observers ofthat process. The term »permis-
sive consensus« 1 0 does express properly the overall attitude towards 
European unification in general and the EC development in particular. 
Opinion poll data 1 1 reveal a weakening of that permissive consensus since 
the mid-seventies.1 2 A decline in helpfulness and solidarity against other 
EC member countries can be taken as one indicator for this slight 
change. 1 3 Another indicator is the reduction of those favouring the 
acceleration of Community development. A growing number of people 
are aware of the fact that EC politics has consequences for the Federal 
Republic and does affect their personal Situation; in their perception 
communitarian Solutions might have negative effects, given the actual 
political, economic and social Situation combined with policy priorities 
and approaches in other EC member countries which are being criticized 
and looked upon with suspicion in many West German political circles. 
This general attitude is being reflected in the behaviour of the West 
German government vis-ä-vis EC development. There was support for 
10 Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold (Europe's Would-Be Polity. Patterns 
of Change in the European Community, Englewood Cliffs 1970) use this term and 
Thomas A. Herz (Europa in der öffentlichen Meinung. Zur politischen Mobilisierung 
in Deutschland und Frankreich zwischen 1962 und 1977, Bonn 1978) does apply it to 
characterize the general attitude towards EC integration tili the early seventies. 
11 The EC Commission publishes since 1973 regularly the survey »eurobarometer«. 
12 See Rudolf Hrbek, »Europa«, in: M. and S. Greiffenhagen/R. Prätorius (eds.), Hand-
wörterbuch zur politischen Kultur der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Opladen 1981, 
pp. 147-150. 
13 77 % (against 7 %) were ready to help a neighbouring country in case of economic 
difficulties in 1973 whereas in 1978 the figures were 63 % (against 12 %). 
initiatives aiming at integration progress; which means an increase in the 
Community's functional scope and/or her institutional capacities. 1 4 But 
the government took great care that fundamentals of German politics -
particularly in economic questions where Bonn insisted on a course ac-
cording to the principles of market economy - would remain intact. 
The failure to establish an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) as 
envisaged in the early seventies can be attributed to divergent outlooks in 
Paris and Bonn. Whereas the Germans regarded economic stability - and 
convergence towards this end amongst the member countries - as a pre-
condition for an EMU, the French argued that monetary union should and 
would contribute to generate stability. t 
The decision of the Schmidt government to set up the European Moneta-
rySy&tem (EMS) in 1978 has - against this background - to be under-
stood as politically motivated: Schmidt considered solidarity with other 
EC partners as necessary investment and disregarded warnings put for-
ward by bankers and representatives of German industry.1 5 
On another policy field the EC underwent a positive development with 
active participation of the Federal Republic: Political Cooperation. This 
is the attempt to achieve common attitudes in foreign policy issues as a 
basis for future common action. For some observers the EPC (introduced 
in 1970) does represent a success story of the Community. 1 6 
Membership in the EC - in a period of »positive integration« (which does 
only refer to attempts aiming at increasing the Community's functional 
scope and does not say that they have been successful) - means per-
manent engagement in EC affairs. Those who are engaged are not only 
government officials but also representatives of socio-political organi-
zations. West German political parties were active in establishing 
during the mid-seventies EC-wide party organizations and they try to 
influence Performance and development of these transnational party fed-
14 Lindberg/Scheingold use these terms in their definition of integration: »Increases in 
scope or in capacity will imply System growth, and in our terms System growth will be 
the same as political integration« (p. 99). 
15 Cf. the monograph of Peter Ludlow: The Making of the European Monetary System, 
London 1982, who understands the establishment of the EMS »as an act of high poli-
tics« (p. 291), which means that the economic and »technical« aspects of this enterprise 
were only marginal. 
16 The articles collected in Christopher Hill (ed.), National Foreign Policies and European 
Political Cooperation, London 1983, present a more ambiguous picture: clear-cut diver-
gencies coexist with the perception of a limited use of Political Cooperation in so far as 
it helps to bring forward national interests. 
erations. 1 7 The same is true for pressure group organizations at the trans-
national level:1 8 COPA, the Euro-organization representing farmers in-
terests, is regarded by the German member Organization as an additional 
instrument to promote its interests." And in UNICE, the European in-
dustrial Organization representing the interests of employers and enter-
prises, the German member Organization is anxious about holding key 
positions and promoting essentials of its program within the complex 
decision making System of the Community. 2 0 The German trade unions, 
as members in the relatively young (founded in 1973, compared with 
COPA and UNICE which started as early as 1958) European Trade 
Union Confederation (ETUC), engage themselves in favour of principles 
they follow domestically; e. g. a cooperative pattern of relations with »the 
other side«, normally called »social partnership«; or rejection of marxist 
and communist tendencies in economic, social and political affairs.2 1 Last 
not least we have to mention the German component in the European 
Parliament and its political groups; German deputies are consistently 
active in favour of integration progress. 2 2 
EC politics is not only dealt with at transnational and supranational 
levels; it is an issue at the national level as well. Within ministries there 
are special divisions for EC affairs; EC questions affect the relations 
17 See Geoffrey and Pippa Pridham, Transnational Parties in the European Community, 
I: The Party Groups in the European Parliament, II: The Development of Party Federa-
tions, in: St. Henig (ed.), Political Parties in den European Community, London 1979; 
G. and P. Pridham, Transnational Party Cooperation and European Integration. The 
Process Towards Direct Elections, London 1981; and Oskar Niedermayer, Europäische 
Parteien? Zur grenzüberschreitenden Interaktion politischer Parteien im Rahmen der 
Europäischen Gemeinschaft, Frankfurt/M. 1983. 
18 Emil J. Kirchner/Konrad Schwaiger (The Role of Interest Groups in the European 
Community, London 1981) give a general overview. 
19 See the comprehensive study of Barbara Burkhardt-Reich /'Wolfgang Schumann, 
Agrarverbände in der EG. Das agrarpolitische Entscheidungsgefüge in Brüssel und den 
EG-Mitgliedstaaten unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Euro-Verbandes COPA 
und seiner nationalen Mitgliedsverbände, Kehl/Straßburg 1983. 
20 See the study of Hans Platzer, Unternehmensverbände in der EG - ihre nationale und 
transnationale Organisation und Politik. Dargestellt am Beispiel des Bundesverbandes 
der Deutschen Industrie, der Bundesvereinigung der deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände, 
der deutschen industriellen Branchenverbände und deren EG-Verbandszusammen-
schlüsse. Kehl/Straßburg 1984. 
21 See the contributions of Rudolf Steierl on the ETUC in: Werner Weidenfeld/ Wolfgang 
Wessels, Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983. Bonn 1981, 
1982, 1983, 1984, in which he pays special attention to that aspect. 
22 See many contributions in: Rudolf Hrbek/Jimmy Jamar/ Wolfgang Wessels (eds.), The 
European Parliament on the Eve of the Second Direct Election: Balance Sheet and 
Prospects, Bruges 1984. 
between the government at the national level and the Länder; implemen-
tation of Community legislation does occupy bureaucracies from the na-
tional to the local level and the courts of justice. 
In sum: membership in the EC has resulted into a pattern of close links 
and interdependence between the Federal Republic and the EC which can 
be understood as »concordance System« following the description of Don-
ald J. Puchala. 2 3 According to that model the EC is a multi-level System 
with a variety of actors; in a later contribution Puchala stated 2 4 that the 
EC »had evolved into an equilibrium condition that I called a Concordan-
ce System«. When he adds, »not only have the nation-states not become 
less important as the Communities have evolved, but they have actually 
become a great deal more important, and, analytically speaking, they 
have become the key to understanding the EC«, he comes close to Stan-
ley Hoffmann's Statement: »The nation-state has survived as the centre of 
political power and the focus of the Citizens' allegiance; . . . However, the 
nation-state coexists with a European enterprise that has limited but real 
powers.« And, most important and provocative to many, he continues: 
»The Community helps preserve the nation-states far more than it forces 
them to wither away . . .«" No doubt that the Federal Republic, like 
other member countries, has survived as a »nation-state«, but it is also true 
that the membership in the EC has served vital national interests. 
23 In his article »Of Blind Men, Elephants and International Integration«, in: Journal of 
Common Market Studies vol. 10, N o . 3 (March 1972), pp. 267-284, he says: »A C o n -
cordance System< by my definition is an international System wherein actors find it 
possible consistently to harmonize their interests, compromise their differences and reap 
mutual rewards from their interactions.« (p. 277). 
24 See his paper »Trends in the Study of European Integration: Recent Efforts by Ameri-
can Scholars« presented for a panel organized by the Research Committee on Europe-
an Unification for the l l th World Congress of the International Political Science 
Association, Moscow, August 1979. 
25 See his article »Reflections on the Nation-State in Western Europe Today«, in: Journal 
of Common Market Studies, special issue »The European Community. Past, Present 
and Future« (ed.: Loukas Tsoukalis), vol. XXI , Nos . 1 + 2 (Sept. /Dec. 1982), 
pp. 21-37, here p. 21. 
1.4. National interests of the Federal Republic and West European 
integration16 
As far as West German politicians were concerned their decision in 
favour of integrating the Federal Republic into Western Europe had been 
founded on their conviction that integration was not only compatible with 
principal objectives of the new West German State but would promote 
their realization. The following objectives can be taken as national inter-
ests of that period: 
- To guarantee peace and security (having experienced two world wars 
and being confronted with the Cold War); 
- to manage economic reconstruction and recovery; 
- to restore the sovereignty, in law and in fact, of the West German State 
in domestic as well as in international affairs; 
- to reunify the separated entities of Germany; 
- to build up and consolidate the Federal Republic as a democracy, 
where State power has to be based on law and where the principle of 
social justice is a fundamental guideline. 
The following balance-sheet will try to answer the question in how far 
membership in the EC system has affected the realization of these inter-
ests. 
- European integration efforts have contributed substantially to main-
taining peace and security. This is true, first, as far as the relations 
amongst West Europeans are concerned. Integration has created a 
»security Community« in the sense Karl W. Deutsch used the term: 2 7 
there are binding rules which exclude the possibility of using violence 
in case of conflicts. These use to be resolved according to accepted rules 
including legal obligations. There is a network of communication 
Channels and a pattern of mutual penetration and dependence. The 
behaviour of the members of this security Community shows that they 
are aware of this pattern; it can easily be calculated. 
Stabilization of the European constellation - between East and West -
is another effect resulting from West Germany's integration. In this 
26 The following is based on Rudolf Hrbek/Wolfgang Wessels, »Nationale Interessen der 
Bundesrepublik Deutsehland und der Integrationsprozeß«, in: Rudolf Hrbek/ Wolfgang 
Wessels (eds.), EG-Mitgliedschaft: ein vitales Interesse der Bundesrepublik Deutsch-
land?, Bonn 1984, pp. 29-69. 
27 See: Political Community and the North Atlantic Area. International Organization in 
the Light of Historical Experience, New York 1957. 
context integration means control of the Federal Republic compared 
with the uncertainties following from the Status of non-alignment or 
neutrality. There are, furthermore, conflicts outside of Europe; an 
integrated Community is better prepared to engage in conflict resolu-
tion than isolated European nation states. 
- No doubt: the EC as a »value-Community« adhering to the ideas of 
basic human rights, democracy and social justice served as a framework 
for the development of the Federal Republic and its democratic politi-
cal culture. 
- The effects of the »economic Community« have been positive ones. 
Economic recovery of post-war Germany would not have been suc-
cessful without belonging to the OEEC; and membership in the EC 
gave incentives for the economic development in the sixties and helped 
managing crises in the seventies. The EC System provides all member 
countries with considerable bargaining power in international 
economic relations which is regarded as an asset in a period of growing 
economic interdependence. 
- The Federal Republic could gain sovereignty as an integral part of an 
international Community whose other members knew about effects of 
mutual links. It was due to the membership in the EC system 
(including political Cooperation) that the Federal Republic could 
widen its freedom of manoeuvre in international relations: the EC 
System serves as basis and backing. 
- German reunification could not be achieved. However, even refraining 
from European integration would not have brought about German 
unity at conditions acceptable for the Western allies and the West 
Germans. Under this premise integration produced some positive 
results: West Germany's partners recognized her special relations 
with the GDR (which can be seen in the rules for commercial rela-
tions of the two Germanies) and they agreed that Community law 
should be applied in West-Berlin. And: without the support of her EC 
partners the Federal Republic would not have been able to pursue the 
Ostpolitik which in part is intended to help leaving the German prob-
lem open. 2 8 
We may conclude that membership in the EC System did help realize the 
major national interests of the Federal Republic in the past. 
28 In this context the term and concept of »peaceful change« - as an element of the 
Helsinki Declaration of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europa (CSCE) 
- is noteworthy; it was due to common efforts of Western as well as neutral and 
non-aligned countries that this principle was agreed upon. 
2. The Federal Republic's role in the EC - the actual debate 
In the first decade following the establishment of the EC in 1958 the 
integration process went smoothly and without greater problems. The 
Situation changed in the seventies. First, three new members - Denmark, 
Ireland and the United Kingdom joined the Community in 1973 -
brought with them particular problems and specific expectations which 
meant a new challenge for the EC having entered the period of »positive 
integration«. Second, the oil crisis in 1973 marked the starting point of a 
period characterized by economic and social strains at a global scale. All 
EC member countries suffered from the crisis, and problem solving 
within the Community framework grew more and more difficult. Many 
observers used the term »crisis« when they tried to characterize properly 
the actual Situation in the EC. Such crises create a »climate« in which 
member countries and groups of actors observe each other carefully and 
with mutual suspicion and criticism. It can easily be understood that big 
member states are much more exposed to such attention and that - as a 
reaction - they themselves reflect on their particular role in the Com-
munity. 
2.1. Perceptions in neighbouring countries 
It were not only economic and social difficulties in other EC member 
countries combined with considerations about the policies the Federal 
Republic should pursue which did generate an intense debate on Bonn's 
EC politics. The end of detente and West Germany's search for her future 
role in the East/West-conflict - or rather: discussions of a possible re-
orientation - were a second source for discussing the German partner's 
role in the EC. 
Integration had - primarily in France - been intended as means of Con-
trolling the German element, and contributing to security and stability of 
post-war Europe. Political circles in West European countries - again 
primarily in France - were concerned about what they understood as 
tendencies in the Federal Republic to loosen her pro Western alignment 
or even to renounce it. They thought they could identify here and there a 
29 The following is based on a recently published contribution of the author (together with 
Wolfgang Wessels); see note 26. 
longing for escaping the framework of East/West-conflict and achieving 
a neutral Status linked with perspectives to realize German unification in 
a totally different political setting. Such a development, they feared, 
would endanger the relative stability of European Status quo. They 
observed with great suspicion discussions within the West German 
peace movement. As a conclusion they questioned reliability and 
trustworthiness of the German partner. Recent French initiatives to 
strengthening the EC and developing it towards a more coherent unit are 
being understood against this background. Again, France seems to play 
the European card as she did in the early fifties. 
The second source generating the debate on Germany's role in the EC has 
been economic and social challenges confronting the other member coun-
tries. They put the question for German solidarity; they criticize tendencies 
in the Federal Republic to complain one-sidedlv about the function of a so-
called »paymaster«. And they demand from the strong German economy 
to function as a »locomotive«: insisting less on stability, instead encourag-
ing more the demand-side on the internal market; and Bonn should increase 
its financial contributions to the EC budget. Furthermore, West Germa-
ny's neighbours complain about economic dominance and insisting on 
»the German model«. 3 0 They accuse Bonn for following an ambiguous 
course and lacking credibility: West German authorities would do them-
selves for what they use to accuse other countries: to give subsidies and 
make the State intervene in economic affairs. 
2.2. Attitudes and arguments within the Federal Republic 
The debate within the Federal Republic has become ambiguous. There is, 
on one side, the approval of German EC membership shared by an over-
whelming majority. This basic attitude can be found in Statements of all 
governments, in declarations of the established political parties and the 
big and influential pressure group organizations. All these actors agree in 
saying: »There is no viable alternative to EC membership for the Federal 
Republic.« 
30 See Frieder Schlupp, »Modell Deutschland and the international division of labour: the 
Federal Republic of Germany in the world political economy«, in: Ekkehart Krippen-
dorff / Volker Rittberger (eds.), The Foreign Policy of West Germany. Formation and 
Contents, London 1980, pp. 33-100. 
And the picture of public opinion seems to be positive, as well. 3 1 »There is 
still a majority who would regret the dissolution of the EC (72 per cent in 
Veen's survey, 51.4 per cent in the Mannheim survey) against an indif-
ferent minority (22 per cent and 40.4 per cent). There is still a majority 
who regard membership of the EC to be a good thing for the FRG (53 per 
cent in eurobarometer and 65 per cent in Veen's survey) and who see 
more advantages (39 per cent in eurobarometer) than disadvantages (24 
per cent). Here the Mannheim figures give a totally different answer: only 
11.8 per cent see advantages, 28 per cent see disadvantages for the FRG. 
An explanation for these contradictory figures might lie in different per-
ceptions of the EC; those who see it primarily as a functional economic 
Community may come to a negative conclusion whereas those who per-
ceive it primarily as a »value« Community, an aspect which Veen stressed 
in his survey, have good reason for an opposite judgement. According 
to Veen, European-mindedness did increase steadily: 40 per cent in the 
autumn of 1983 and 45 per cent in March 1984 feit as Europeans despite 
the >crisis< in economic and financial matters.« 3 2 
However, there is, on the other side, widespread disappointment and in-
creasing criticsm. People - and politicians - criticize the System of CAP 
(the EC agricultural policy) leading to huge overproduction which con-
sumes about two thirds of the Community budget - a waste of resources 
in the eyes of most observers. They are grumbling about Brüssels bureau-
cracy which is supposed - wrongly! - to be inefficient and overmanned. 
And they become angry about what has been called the »paymaster« -
function of the Federal Republic. The relatively low turn-out in the 1984 
direct elections to the European Parliament in the Federal Republic 
(56,8 % against 65,7 % in 1979) has to be seen as product of such a 
»climate«. 
We can identify a much more fundamental criticism against the EC 
stemming from what Ronald Inglehart has called »the silent revolution«3 3 
31 Cf. three recent surveys: 1. Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, Mannheim: Meinungen zur 
Europawahl, January 1984; 2. Surveys done 1983/84 by the Sozialwissenschaftliches 
Forschungsinstitut of the Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation, summarized by Hans-Joa-
chim Veen (»Kein Durchblick, aber dicke Sympathie«, article in Rheinischer Mer-
kur/Christ und Welt, May 25, 1984); 3. Eurobarometer No. 21 (May 1984), special 
issue. 
32 Rudolf Hrbek, »European Elections: Germany«, in: Electoral Studies vol. 3, No. 3 
(Dec. 1984), pp. 278-281, here p. 278. 
33 Title of a publication (Princeton 1977) with the subtitle »Changing values and political 
style among Western publics«. 
and what appears to be a shift in the value System of individuals towards 
preferring positions of »post-materialism«. There is growing scepticism 
with respect to values like material wealth, economic growth and con-
sumption which are being associated with the EC. It was primarily the 
Greens who did base their election campaign on this line of arguments. 
»They declared themselves >for another Europe - think globally, act at the 
local level< (>Für ein anderes Europa - global denken, örtlich handeln<). 
Their main concern was for peace and disarmament, for an alternative 
agricultural policy, against capitalist interests and the power of multi-
national enterprises, for decentralization and efficient protection of our 
natural environment, against the adoption of a superpower Status for 
Europe«. 3 4 With 8.2 per cent of the votes they were remarkably success-
ful. 
Amongst the reasons which can explain why the EC has lost attraction 
and support are: the motivation typical for the early years of European 
integration has lost its drive; the Performance of the Community is disap-
pointing to many and has a rather demobilizing effect; political and 
economic developments in other EC member countries are looked upon 
with suspicion: some German observers are anxious to avoid a spill-
over of »wrong« approaches and policies, particularly in economic 
affairs. There is obviously a core potential ready to question fundamen-
tally future membership in the EC. This was the background for analy-
zing the Federal Republic's actual interests in the EC System. The result 
shall be presented in the following chapter. 3 5 
3. The importance of the EC System for the Federal Republic 
For considerations on the importance of the EC System for the Federal 
Republic we can distinguish between two aspects or qualities: the EC 
34 Rudolf Hrbek (see note 32), p. 279. 
35 The analysis was done in a study group established within the framework of the Institut 
für Europäische Politik, Bonn. The result has been published in a volume, edited by the 
author and Wolfgang Wessels, EG-Mitgliedschaft: ein vitales Interesse der Bundesre-
publik Deutschland?, Bonn 1984; the editors are authors of the concluding chapter 
(»Das EG-System als Problemlösungsebene und Handlungsrahmen - Optionen bundes-
republikanischer Europa-Politik«, pp. 501-542), which summarizes the case studies and 
considers options of German politics in the EC. 
system as a framework for problem-solving in specific policy fields and as 
an overall frame of reference for the West German polity, its characteris-
tic features and its political activities. 
3.1 The EC System as a framework for problem-solving in specific policy 
fields 
The conclusion which can be drawn from the analysis of a series of policy 
fields is that EC membership does not violate interests of the Federal 
Republic and that she was not expected or obliged to make undue sacrifi-
cies in favour of the Community and integration progress. The EC frame-
work has not proved to be irrelevant; where it did not yet contribute 
substantially to problem-solving one can attribute it to potential future 
effects; in other words: there are not yet exhausted possibilities for com-
munitarian action. 
As far as advantages of EC politics are concerned the balance-sheet from 
a West German point of view shows an ambiguous picture, or better: is 
being perceived differently. We are familiär with such patterns of reaction 
and behavior from experiences in the nation-state: which group of actors 
affected by political decisions (or: non-decisions) would admit to be satis-
fied? There are fields where the Federal Republic did profit from Com-
munity politics (e. g. West Germany's industry gains from a big European 
market). And in other fields German actors managed - or have tried - to 
adapt themselves to EC realities and rules successfully (e. g. the German 
farmers proved themselves to be very clever in exhausting all possibilities 
the common agricultural policy did offer them and gave the lie to those 
who had expected disastrous consequences of CAP for German agricul-
ture; or, as in the case of the EMS, the Federal Republic combined active 
participation with adopting a defensive attitude and behaviour). 
The following considerations of German actors may explain why they 
attribute to the EC framework only a limited function and use for effi-
cient problem-solving. As there are diverging principles throughout the 
Community - esp. in the management of economic affairs - German 
actors tend to prefer efforts and Solutions at the national level where they 
can follow their preferred guidelines and norms. Then we can find in the 
Federal Republic the argument that other EC member countries are not 
prepared for efficient communitarian strategies and activities in specific 
policy fields. Third countries are regarded as superior to (some) EC 
partners in this respect. Furthermore, there is criticism against the Bruss-
eis bureaucracy which is being made the scapegoat for deficiencies for 
which in fact the governmental side of the EC decision-making System is 
much more responsible. And there is the conviction that for specific 
concerns frameworks other than the EC remain essential (e. g. in ques-
tions of commercial relations the Federal Republic cannot and will not 
accept absolute priority for the Community, as she is dependent to a 
certain degree on the world market; or in the field of - military - security, 
where attempts for better coordination amongst Western European coun-
tries do not imply - according to West German interests - tendencies to 
prepare a Substitute for NATO but rather to establish new links be-
tween the USA and the Western European component of the alliance). 
Another conclusion from the analysis of a series of policy fields is that the 
expected effect of internal rationalization - for which a bigger unit offers 
good chances - leaves much to be desired. In other words: there are areas 
with promising but not yet exhausted possibilities (e. g. high technology, 
energy, large-scale research, protection of the environment are fields in 
which communitarian efforts should be made). 
There seems to be consensus that the Community's bargaining power in 
international relations can be regarded as an asset for the member coun-
tries, including the Federal Republic. Even a medium size country takes 
profit from belonging to a greater unit; she can hide herseif »behind« the 
others. This advantage, however, is linked with the possible disadvantage 
being made responsible for Performance and activities of the Community 
in international affairs. 
3.2. The EC System and principal objectives of the Federal Republic in 
the eighties 
The importance of the EC System for the Federal Republic is highly 
dependent on its contribution for the realization of her principal objec-
tives, her »national« interests. A list of such objectives has been given in a 
previous paragraph; there they had been formulated in the perspective of 
post-war needs. In general, the elements listed remain valid, they only 
need some actualization. 
- The first aim is to maintain peace and security and organize the coex-
istence of nations and countries in the whole of Europe according to 
the perspective of the Helsinki Declaration. An isolated national 
strategy has to be excluded as a promising approach; the Federal 
Republic is dependent on being integrated in a Community of countries 
with the same political System. In this respect the EC System repre-
sents now and in the future a »security Community«; a close network 
of communication Channels does help avoiding misunderstandings, 
mutual irritation and contribute to maintaining a sense of reliability 
and trust amongst the member countries, thus stabilizing the all 
European constellation. Successful Ostpolitik, which will remain a 
major concern for the Federal Republic needs support from her part-
ners. No doubt, the Community is better able to deal with problems 
and conflicts in the Third World which might affect European security 
interests compared to isolated national activities. Steps towards 
improving the mechanism of Political Cooperation are regarded as 
favourable for German interests. Last not least: defense issues can be 
found on agendas in the EC context. The Federal Republic having 
denied any national approach and ambition in this field, must be 
interested - given her geographical Situation in the actual East/West 
constellation - in influencing efforts to reform structures which might 
be decisive for her security in future years. 
The second aim is to guarantee economic well-being; today this has to 
include the consideration how new needs (social security and füll 
employment; protection of the natural environment; development of 
Third World countries) can be met best. The Federal Republic will 
continue to need the internal common market. Here some observers 
see a dilemma for Bonn if the Federal Republic was expected to accept 
and join a more protectionist course of the Community as the price for 
the advantages of the internal market. Bonn will have to try finding a 
balanced Solution which shall at the same time consider needs of some 
partners and be compatible with her own interests. There is consensus 
about the chances stemming from the potential lying in the EC frame-
work, as was described above. Belonging to the economic Community 
and strengthening it gives manyfold opportunities for influencing atti-
tude and behaviour of the partners. 
Membership in the EC System reduces formally the freedom of action; 
in practice, however, it opens the Federal Republic new possibilities to 
bring forward her own concerns. 
A Solution of the German question - the forth aim - which means 
primarily to give the Germans the right of self-determination or, in 
other words, to overcome the present unnatural neighbourhood be-
tween the two Germanies (with an impermeable and martially guarded 
frontier and severe restrictions for free communication of individuals 
in both directions), can be achieved, if at all, only with the consent of 
Germany's European neighbours. The overwhelming majority of Ger-
mans are aware of the fact that only Europeanization of the German 
question is a viable perspective. Adequate consideration of the inter-
ests of these neighbours is a precondition for attempts aiming at a 
Solution which has to be looked for within a European framework. The 
re-establishment of a German nation State cannot be a realistic goal 
any longer, nor should European integration be regarded as counter-
productive to a satisfactory development of the German question. One 
should not forget that two former Occuping Powers who still hold 
responsibility for affairs affecting Germany as a whole (cf. the Four 
Power Agreement on Berlin of 1971) are EC member countries and 
that West-Berlin does need for her survival as a free political entity to 
be integrated into the Western Community including the EC frame-
work. 
- The EC as a »value Community«3 6 serves the aim of strengthening and 
developing the Federal Republic's political system. And second: West 
European societies are confronted today with challenges affecting 
their value Systems. Such challenges might emerge within individual 
countries but the Community framework will have a strong impact on 
the eventual development. 
We may conclude: the EC system does and shall contribute to realizing 
»national« interests of the Federal Republic. 
3.3. The EC system as an overall frame of reference for the Federal 
Republic 
The reflections in the previous paragraph allow us to conclude that an 
evaluation of the EC system based only on its effects for selected sectors 
would be insufficient. Its function for the Federal Republic goes far 
beyond having limited use for particular policy fields: it does represent 
36 See for example the 1973 Statement of Foreign Ministers on European Identity; the 1978 
Declaration of the European Council on Democracy; numerous resolutions adopted by 
the European Parliament; the Stuttgart Declaration of the European Council of June 
1983; or the Draft Treaty Establishing the European Union adopted 1984 by the Euro-
pean Parliament. All these documents refer expressively to basic values like human 
rights, democracy, social justice and rule of law. 
the overall frame of reference for the West German State, its political 
system and its development. A pattern of rules - explicit and codified but 
also implicit and tacitly understood - and behaviour did emerge within 
the EC system; this pattern can be labelled as an »international regime« 
according to the interdependence theory. 3 7 It is this quality of the EC 
system which in the light of historic experience will remain of central 
importance for the Federal Republic. Belonging to that kind of frame-
work does offer security to the Germans and her neighbours as well. 
3.4. The relationship between the two qualities of the EC system 
There is a close connexion between the two qualities of the EC system: 
The image of the Community will suffer if its capacity for problem-sol-
ving were insufficient. The frame of reference will remain stable only 
when impending problems are met efficiently. This is true particularly 
with regard to issues which are given high(est) priority and which need to 
be solved convincingly. The reverse is true as well: the ability to solve 
problems will suffer if the overall framework would break or its coheren-
ce and stability be reduced. 
The conclusion for Bonn's politics in the EC is: the Federal Republic has 
to contribute to the Community's ability to problem-solving which does 
require German »Investments« into the EC system; otherwise she runs the 
risk to lose the advantage of the overall framework which would do harm 
to German »national« interests. The question arises: which strategy 
should the Federal Republik pursue and are there alternative options? 
4. Bonn's EC politics in the late eighties: options and strategiesn 
There are, broadly speaking, two dimensions where the EC system could 
be developed further: in its functional scope and its institutional capaci-
ties; both dimensions are closely interrelated since both have to do with 
efficient problem-solving. Imagine the Community had legal competences 
37 Puchala in his 1979 paper does apply elements of the interdependence concept to the 
EC. 
38 This chapter draws from the author's contribution mentioned in footnote 35. 
in specific fields but decision-making would be blocked - for whatever 
reason -, then the respective problems would remain unresolved. Or, the 
Community was not yet given power in specific sectors: even working 
Community institutions were unable to tackle problems in those fields. 
Most observers of the EC-system agree that since the years 1979/80 the 
Community has been paralyzed primarily by deficiencies in the decision-
making system: they refer to the habit of member governments - which 
has meanwhile developed towards a rule - to use the Veto, thus violating 
the norm of applying the majority principle in many cases as set up in the 
treaties; or to the reduction of the Commission towards an international 
secretariat instead of a Community institution exerting the right of initia-
tive and functioning as engine of the integration process. 
The conclusion for a German policy of investing into the EC system: 
Bonn should try to overcome these deficiencies and contribute to improv-
ing the decision-making capacity of the EC machinery. The initiative 
taken by West German Foreign Minister Genscher in 1981 went in this 
direction. His objectives: strengthening Commission and European 
Parliament (as an additional driving force), making the Council of 
Ministers more efficient not by enforcing majority decisions - in case of 
crucial issues (e. g. decision on new policies, on enlargement, on financial 
contributions) the treaties do demand unanimity - but by introducing 
procedures which should make it more difficult for member governments 
to use the Veto even in minor cases. The outcome of his initiative was 
disappointing: some member countries refused agreement with these 
rather modest proposals. 3 9 And there is little hope that two years later an 
agreement could be reached easier. 4 0 One should not forget, however, that 
deficiencies in the decison-making system of the EC do reflect a lacking 
sense of solidarity amongst the member countries, resulting from diver-
ging interests and attitudes. 
A second »investment« could be forwarded in the Community's func-
tional scope. No doubt, there is a broad field of possible activities which 
in the Federal Republic are given high priority, e. g. measures to protect 
39 The so-called Stuttgart Declaration, adopted by the European Council at its meeting in 
June 1983. 
40 The European Council at Fontainebleau in June 1984 decided to set up a special com-
mittee on institutional questions (»Dooge Committee«) which presented an interim-re-
port to the European Council in Dublin in December 1984. Therein are reflected the still 
existing divergencies in attitude towards Community development (cf. more than 30 
footnotes expressing reservations, especially made by the representatives of Denmark, 
Greece, UK and Ireland). 
the environment, Steps towards economic convergence, projects in 
modern technology. But Bonn cannot expect all partners in the EC to 
follow with enthusiasm respective proposals since not all countries are 
either Willing or able to do so. Greece for example does insist on a 
comprehensive Mediterranean program which would contribute to nar-
rowing the gap between the rieh North and the less developed South of 
the EC, let alone the general attitude of the present Socialist government 
towards the integration progress. But even in case Socialist leader Papan-
dreou would lose the next general elections to be held in 1985 and be 
replaced by the liberal-conservative Mitsotakis of the New Democracy 
party which is much more positive towards the EC and integration pro-
gress, Greece would have great difficulties joining ambitious and costly 
projects in high technology. 
It is against this background that alternative strategies are being discuss-
ed. The Federal Republic or German actors are not authors of such 
alternatives - their origin lies sometimes in the dark; they do appear and 
are then subject of general consideration - but she has to make up her 
mind about them. We will check them briefly. 
- The Option of strengthening intergovernmental bargaining would 
mean further weakening the Rome-system which in principle provided 
some balance between Community institutions. This Option would be 
at the expense of Commission and European Parliament - let alone 
the Economic and Social Committee - and would not be compatible 
with German interests: as the Option would result in the abolition of 
the EC system as a stable framework on a legal basis. 
- Another Option would have the same result (weakening or abolishing 
the framework of a Community with legal obligations as described 
above): to establish a multilateral steering group of the big member 
countries (the French term »directoire« may remind of de Gaulle's 
coneept for re-strueturing NATO by having a trilateral institution of 
that kind) and give them the say in EC affairs. Such »reform« would in 
the medium or long run inevitably lead to dissolving the EC-system 
since the smaller countries cannot be expected to agree with being 
discriminated and marginalized. Experience in Community develop-
ment teils that relations between small and big countries and the 
small's pereeptions of that relationship are a highly sensitive issue. 4 1 
41 A Symposion of Europeanists, assembled in TEPSA (Trans European Policy Studies 
Association), met in July 1984 at Cork University (Ireland) to deal with this issue, 
prepared by the Irish Organisation. 
- A growing number of Europeanists do advocate French-German bi-
lateralism as the most promising Option. They can refer to historic 
experience: »the >Franco-German axis< has kept the European enter-
prise going«. 4 2 And indeed, there was integration progress only when 
these two countries went together: this was true for the Schuman Plan 
as it was for the EMS; on the other hand, EDC failed due to French 
Opposition and the EMU project in the early seventies could not be 
launched successfully since both governments disagreed on its 
premise. They are the key members and some attribute to them the 
role of a federator. No doubt, they are best prepared to give incentives; 
but advocating French-German bilateralism goes far beyond: many 
understand it as an alternative to the Community of Ten or at least as 
a coalition able to push the other more reluctant EC members in 
whatever direction of EC-development. This expectation is, however, 
over-optimistic and underrates diverging attitudes towards policy 
objectives (incl. their priorities) and instruments to achieve them, as 
well (e. g. the field of external trade where France argues in favour of 
more protectionist measures combined with what she calls »Com-
munity priority« whereas the interests of the Federal Republic require 
openness towards third countries (and their markets); or the field of 
defense and military security where France is not yet Willing to extend 
protection - and guarantee - provided by her nuclear deterrent force 
to the West German territory; or the issue of lead-free petrol com-
bined with catalyst-equipped cars which is given high priority and 
much public attention in Germany whereas France does exploit all 
possibilities inherent in the Community law to postpone the 
implementation of such innovation for egoistic economic reasons). 
- The European Parliament is offering another option: when the major-
ity of the Strasbourg Assembly adopted early in 1984 a Draft Treaty 
Establishing a European Union it called for a European Consti-
tution. 4 3 The overwhelming majority of observers agree that the initia-
tive is too ambitious and has no chance in the forseeable future to be 
accepted (= ratified according to the respective constitutional provi-
sions) by all 10 member countries. Denmark for example would refuse 
any such far-reaching step. 
42 Stanley Hoffmann, »France's Relations with West Germany«, in: German Studies News-
letter (issued by The Center for European Studies, Harvard University), Febr. 1985, 
No. 4, p. 5. 
43 See the contribution of J. Schwarze in this Conference. 
The Option of returning to the core area of the original Six seems, 
against this background, plausible. Those in favour of it do intend to 
revitalize the Rome-system with a limited number of participants. The 
option implies to admit that enlargement had been wrong; and it 
implies to expel the four new members (furthermore to refuse Portugal 
and Spain admittance) - a step which has no legal basis in the treaties. 
Realizing the option would mean a radical Solution and an expensive 
one, since the »reconstruction« of the EC system could be carried 
through only on the price of costly compensations for those leaving. 
There are doubts whether a Community of Six were to meet German 
interests: what about the stability of the new framework; what about 
security policy as a communitarian issue if the UK were to be outside? 
Wouldn't it be promising to put pressure on reluctant members by 
threatening them with such options - to continue integration in a core 
area, to Start with French-German bilateralism or the multilateral 
steering group approach? A threat needs to be credible and here lies 
the weakness of such a »bluff«-strategy: there are considerable doubts 
as far as the determination of those is concerned who would exert 
pressure to follow actually the announced course. 
This is true as well for another option: disengagement or even withdra-
wal of the Federal Republic from the EC system. The other members 
know very well about Bonn's dependence on the EC in its two quali-
ties. As this option is not viable it cannot be used properly as a credible 
threat. Interdependence, at least amongst the core area of the original 
six EC member countries, has reached an intensity which does exclude 
efforts to cut the links. 
As none of these options offers a convincing concept there seems to 
remain only one Solution for the EC system's practical Performance: 
»muddling through«. Implications and consequences of that »normal« 
method of managing Community affairs are: postponing problems or 
package deals. For the Federal Republic muddling through would 
mean maintaining the overall framework but no efficient problem-sol-
ving. As we have pointed out earlier the framework will suffer and lose 
its appeal if the EC system proves itself unable to meet expectations 
of the population (= electorate) for the problem-solving. Muddling 
through cannot be expected to generate support for the EC system but 
rather a feeling of disappointment and aversion which politicians can-
not and will not ignore permanently. We may conclude that in a period 
characterized by economic and social difficulties and severe challenges 
confronting the countries and their societies muddling through cannot 
be regarded as an adequate strategy and behaviour. This explains why 
several alternative strategies mentioned above did appear on the agen-
da of the EC System. 
- There is an ultimate Option thought to escape the present dilemma, 
overcome apathy (combined with frustration and helplessness) and 
prevent the EC system from being eroded further and further: Two-or-
Multi-Tier Integration. The Belgian politician Tindemans, former Pri-
me Minister, in his 1975 Report to the European Council on European 
Union, had proposed 
»that in the Community framework of an overall idea of a 
European Union . . . and on the basis of an action program estab-
lished by the Community institutions for a certain policy area and 
which has found the general agreement of all, 
1. those countries which are able to proceed should be obliged to 
proceed, 
2. those countries which have objective reasons, acknowledged by 
the Council on the proposal of the Commission, not to proceed 
further, should lag behind, 
while receiving the other countries' aid and assistance . . . in order 
to be able to catch up with them; and while participating in the 
Community institutions in the assessment of the results achieved in 
the respective area.« 4 4 
Since then a debate has taken place about variations of that approach. 
The main idea has been to enable the integration progress at least 
among those member countries who share parallel interests and are 
prepared to proceed as a Community »sub-system«. The concept of 
two-or-multi-tier integration can be defined as follows: 
- »In the interest of the progress of EC integration, objectives are 
agreed upon at the Community level. 
- At the same time all member countries accept that the policy to 
attain the goals is at first implemented by some member countries 
only, the others being authorized to stay aside for an indefinite -
but not unlimited - period of time or to refrain from participating. 
- The socio-economic differences or other objective obstacles which 
give rise to this two-or-multi-tier approach are to be reduced in the 
44 Quotation in: E. Grabitz (ed.), Abgestufte Integration. Eine Alternative zum herkömm-
lichen Integrationskonzept?, Kehl/Strasbourg 1984, p. 27. This is the first comprehensi-
ve analysis of the concept, containing English summaries for each chapter. 
course of time by Community and/or national measures so that the 
aspired goal of integration can be attained by all member coun-
tries.« 4 5 
Those who favour this approach underline that it would apply to new 
policy fields only and leave the »acquis communautaire« untouched; they 
stress that »by setting the goals jointly on the Community level (example: 
EMS) a possible undermining of the Community system and a violation 
of solidarity will be prevented.«4 6 
There are a number of objections to that approach or at least critical 
questions expressing concern about its implications for the EC system as 
a whole; e.g. that »the pressure on member countries to seek common 
Solutions which are acceptable to all would be lessened«; that the concept 
might eventually »threaten the >acquis communautaire««; that »legal uni-
ty and its guardian, the European Court of Justice, may lose its strength«; 
that »the role of Community institutions may be weakened, esp. if 
arrangements are made on an intergovernmental level«; that the crucial 
question how to reconcile financial needs of the sub-group and the Com-
munity as a whole has to be answered satisfactorily.4 7 All these points 
would have to be clarified before two-or-multi-tier integration could be 
adopted as a complementary integration strategy agreed upon by all 
members. 
Given the dilemmas in Community Performance and development 
described above the concept - »a typical second-best Solution« compared 
to the approach towards complete integration 4 8 - looks promising for the 
Federal Republic provided that all critical problems could be solved satis-
factorily; the overall criterion for Bonn would be to keep the EC system 
as a general framework. But what will happen if no agreement could be 
reached amongst the Ten to use this approach? There seems to be no 
alternative to countinue with muddling through and deal with different 
issues on the agenda of the EC system: e.g. the prices for agrarian pro-
ducts have to be fixed for 1985; the gap in the 1985 budget has to be filled; 
agreement on the introduction of lead-free petrol and the catalyst-equip-
ped car has to be reached; and the accession of Portugal and Spain has to 
be decided upon - these are only few of the impending issues. 
45 According to Grabitz, p. 28. 
46 Grabitz, p. 29. 
47 Grabitz, p. 29/30. 
48 Grabitz, p. 384. 
